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ABSTRACT 
This study presents a transformational analysis of corporate ownership and control in the 
UK. Using a sample of 643, UK listed non-financial companies and relying on data from the 
Office for National Statistics, this analysis revealed a declining ownership by major 
institutional domestic ownership coupled with an increase in foreign ownership. The study 
further found 42% of UK companies having multiple large shareholders and that about 40% 
of the sampled firms separated cash flow-rights from control-rights, confirming the presence 
of controlling block holders. This is contrary to the traditional understanding that UK 
ownership structure is dispersed. These findings are significant given the little attention in 
literature examining corporate ownership and control structures of corporations in the UK.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The 20th century has witnessed a decline in individual ownership and significant growth of 
institutional ownership. In his book Cheffins (2008), reveals that in post-World War II 
period, UK institutional investors faced some difficulties when investing stocks and were 
discouraged due to lack of sufficient investor protection. In spite of these difficulties, a the 
promise of superior returns relative to other options made shareholding in UK companies an 
attractive option. In this article, we analyse the trends of corporate ownership and control 
among UK companies. This article focuses on the UK for several reasons: First, the UK is a 
developed market and has relatively better investor protection measures than most European 
countries. Secondly, according to Laeven and Levine (2008), about 40% of the Western 
European firms have their roots in the UK. Thirdly, the level of disclosure for UK companies 
is relatively higher compared to most European countries and thus data is more readily 
available. Indeed accessibility of data is a pertinent issue and can at times be frustrating. 
Faccio and Lang (2002) when tracing the ultimate ownership of unlisted companies of the 
companies in Western Europe, also single out UK as benign choice; “Where the ultimate 
owner of a corporation is an unlisted firm, we tried to trace its owners using all available data 
sources. We had incomplete success because most of our sample countries do not require 
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unlisted firms to disclose their owners. One exception is the UK, where the 3% disclosure 
rule also applies to unlisted firms” (p.373) 
The UK equity market has recently witnessed a decline in equity ownership by local 
institutional investors and a rapid increase in foreign ownership (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012). According to statistics, ownership by UK pension funds fell from 17.2% in 
2004 to 13.4% at the end of 2010 while ownership by UK insurance companies declined from 
15.7% in 2004 to 8.6 % in 2010. Within the same period, foreign ownership increased from 
36.3% in 2004 to 41.2% in 2010, (see figure 1 below). On average since 1963 to 2010, the 
percentage of ownership by foreign investors has been on the increase.  Furthermore, 
contrary to the traditional belief that listed firms in the UK have dispersed ownership 
structures, Leaven and Levine (2008) reported a surprise finding where in a sample of 689 
listed companies in UK about 75% of them had either multiple large shareholders or one 
large shareholder. Leaven and Levine (2008) specifically report that 26.7% of firms have no 
controlling owner, and 42.8% have one controlling owner while 30.5% of the sample 
represents companies with multiple large shareholders.  
Ownership structure, which was previously characterised as dispersed, has now 
become more concentrated. Previously, most large public companies operating in London 
Stock Exchange had ownership of shares widely dispersed but it appears this changed. 
According to Cheffins (2008), transfer of ownership from individual shareowners to 
institutional investors has occasioned the shift. 
FIGURE 1: 
UK Average Ownership Distribution among Different Owners’ Identities 1963-2010 
 
Source: Data sourced from office for National Statistics; Ownership Statistics Bulletin (2010) 
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The trend of share ownership as described in National Office for Statistics bulletin 
(2010) reveal that since 1963, individual shareholding has been falling. Several factors have 
been associated with this trend and two seem to be more relevant. The first factor is the wave 
of privatization that evolved in the early 1990s. Secondly, the demutualization of most 
building societies in the UK appears to have catalysed the exit of individual shareholders’. 
These factors among others are suspected to have significantly contributed to the sustained 
downward trend of individual stakes from 54% in 1963 to around 11% in 2010, which 
reflected in figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
Individual Ownership Distribution (1963-2010) 
 
In the last two decades, European capital markets have witnessed a loosening of restrictions 
in the operational environments, for example restriction on capital exports. According to 
Hurtsi (2006), in earlier periods foreign ownership of share was either strictly prohibited or 
restricted to shares without voting rights. Since then, major changes have taken place and 
investors can now invest across borders.  In figure 3 below, we note that over the last 20 
years, the proportion of UK shares owned by foreigners increased substantially from 4 per 
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It will be noted that as individual shareholdings continued to decrease, institutional 
ownership was on the rise. A more interesting observation is the increase in foreign 
ownership. In an ownership survey, the Office for National Statistics reported that by 2000 
foreign share ownership shot up significantly to 35.7 per cent, which had risen to around 41 
per cent in 2010.  
FIGURE 3 
Foreign Ownership Distribution (1963-2010) 
 
According to the Office of National Statistics report, investors from North America 
dominated foreign investors investing in UK companies contributing about 56% per cent of 
foreign investment.  Within the same period European holdings of UK shares dropped from 
38% in 2001 to 28% at the end of 2010. According to Mallin (2007), most foreign investors 
are US-based and the rapid increase in foreign investment has begun to influence the 
behaviour of UK investors by enhancing the investor activism because US investors have 
more concerns on corporate governance issues. While this is happening for foreign investors, 
UK institutional shareholding is on the downward side. The proportion of share held by 
insurance companies shot up by 7% from 1963 to 2004.The figure started dropping by 1% 
since 2000 up to 2002, the drop became more significant in 2003, and from 2004 to 2010, the 
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Insurance Ownership Distribution (1963-2010) 
 
 
This decrease in ownership by insurance companies is associated to several factors. 
According to Cheffins, (2008), some regulations and market factors are responsible for this 
down turn. The regulatory changes in 2004 by UK Financial Securities Authority on the 
treatment of life insurer’s assets and liabilities was one of the key factor which accelerated 
the noted drop of equity ownership by insurance companies. Different from traditional 
accounting treatment where investment assets were valued in such a manner that they 
fluctuate with market value while liabilities do not, current accounting treatments require also 
liabilities to vary with market value to benefit the insured. The new form of accounting 
treatment is less attractive for insurers’ because they have to provide for implied future 
obligation to pay more obligations in a potential market downturn. Speculatively, this could 
be the major reason why insurance companies became equity net sellers in the 2000-2003 
stock market downturn noted by Cheffins (2008). 
A similar situation was replicated by pension funds where the decrease from 2004 hit 
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received by pension funds in regards to tax  and the drift to liability-driven investments in 
2005 where assets and liabilities associated with the pension schemes ought to be matched by 
investment managers. As Cheffins,(2008) notes, this is contrary to the practice of the 1990s 
where dividends received by pension funds were tax exempt. The abolishment of this tax free 
dividends incentive in 1997 amounted to a shift of pension funds from equities investments, 
which is reflected in figure 5. 
 
FIGURE 5 
Pension Fund Ownership Distribution (1963-2010) 
 
 
Uniquely non-financial institutions have experienced no specific trend up to 2004 
where the level of their ownership have been linearly increasing until 2010 .Overall, the 
foreign investors shareholdings and other financial institutional ownership have been 
increasing while UK institutional share ownership has been decreasing. This trend is shown 
in figure 6 below. On the other hand, ownership by banks has also been increasing and in 
2008, the level of ownership of banks has shot to 3.5% and dropped down in 2010 to 2.5%, 
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FIGURE 6 




TRANSFORMATION OF UK OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
Previous studies have consistently shown that the UK ownership structure is more dispersed 
relative to other European countries. Recent literature, however, indicates a change of UK 
ownership structure from dispersed to concentrate. According to Marchica and Mura (2005), 
more than 10% of firms in UK are controlled through complex structures and the degree of 
departure of control-rights from cash-flow rights is reported to be around 11% at a 10% 
threshold.  It is, therefore, hard to doubt that the presence of complex control structures may 
be being used by controlling shareholders to expropriate the interests of minority 
shareholders in the UK. Using a sample of 643 UK listed non-financial companies; this study 
reveals that ownership in the UK is more complex than considered by most previous 
ownership studies. The study reveals that, 42% of UK companies have multiple large 
shareholders and about 40% of the sample firms separate cash flow-rights from control-
rights, confirming the presence of controlling block holders. This is contrary to the orthodox 
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FIGURE 7 





Table 1 shows the distinguished ownership structure based on shareholders’ voting rights. An 
owner was said to be ultimate if he/she owned over 20 per cent of company’s direct or 
indirect voting rights. The alternative cut-off of 10 per cent has also been conventionally used 
in literature and both criteria provide significant thresholds of votes (Faccio & Lang, 2002; 
La Porta et al, 1999). If a company had no shareholder holding more than 20% of equity 
ownership, it was classified as a widely held company. In their recent study on complex 
ownership and valuation, Laeven and Levine (2008) have used a similar approach to classify 
ownership holding. The types of ownership applied in this study and defined by Faccio and 
Lang (2002) include; 
a) Family, which comprises of a firm owned by individual and not listed on any stock 
exchange. 
b) Widely held financial institutions: A financial firm, which is widely held at the 20%, 10% 
or 5% control threshold. 
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TABLE 1 
Companies Ownership characteristics 
 
 Widely Held owners 
at 5% threshold 
Ultimate  owners at 
5% threshold 
Total  
Number of Companies 343 300 643 
Percentage 53.3% 46.7% 100% 
 
In this study, the ultimate ownership was analysed and the results in table 1.1 show that, 
about 46.7% of sample firms used are those controlled by ultimately held companies at 10% 
threshold while 53.3% of all firms are firms owned by widely held companies at 10% 
threshold. This shows that UK ownership structure is not as dispersed as previously claimed 
Ownership Distribution Based on Block holders’ Types 
The literature realizes that the diverse group of share owners have different levels of 
monitoring competence, different levels of wealth, different preferences about the way they 
like to receive the return on their investments, different cultures and so many cross-border 
differences, Thomsen and Pedersen (2000). According to the authors, the identity of firm’s 
owners may determine their goals and this might have a great impact on the firm’s behaviour 
which ultimately affects the firm’s financial decisions and firm value in particular. For 
instance, the interest of financial institutional investors may be to realize short term return on 
their investments and they would just sell their shares when a firm suffers a down turn while 
corporations or non-financial institutions may be more focused on the long term- relationship 
hence make effort to participate in a restructuring process, Douma et al (2006). Table 2 
presents the distribution of shareholders’ types at 10% threshold. The table shows that, 
widely held financial institutions and 64.7 % by family firms control 24.7% of companies 
with ultimate ownership at 10% threshold. The table also reports that 10.6% represents other 
shareholders apart from family companies and financial institutions. 
 
TABLE 2 
Sample Distribution Based on Shareholders’ Types 
  Number and Percentage in bracket of  Companies with Ultimate 
Ownership 
Type of shareholder Financial Institutions Family Companies      Others 
At 10% threshold       74 (24.7%) 194 (64.7%) 32 (10.6%) 
Distribution of Control Structures 
Furthermore, table 3 shows that, 47.3% of the sample firms (643) have multiple large 
shareholders with the largest shareholder holding at least 20% of equity share and the second 
largest owning the minimum of 10% of the equity share as defined by Laeven and Levine 
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(2008) and Faccio and Lang (2002) as in La Porta et al. (1999). Following Faccio and Lang, 
(2002), in this study a controlling shareholder is said to be “alone” if no other owner controls 
at least 10% (or 20%) of the voting rights. Table 3 reports that, 54.7% of the sample firms are 
firms with single controlling shareholder at 10% threshold while about 50% of the sample 
firms are companies controlled by single class closely held firms. Likewise, as in Faccio and 
Lang (2002), this study defines a pyramid firm as a firm with an ultimate owner who controls 
it indirectly through another corporation which it does not wholly control. Further 
examination of control structures reveals that some companies have both pyramidal structure 
and dual-class equity structure. Table 3 shows that, while about 26% of the sample firms are 
considered to have dual-class equity structure about 31% have pyramidal structure. The table 
reports further that only 7% of the sample firms comprise of both pyramidal and dual share 
structure. 
TABLE 3 










closely held firms  
Controlled by 
single class 
closely held firms  
304 (47.3%) 352(54.7%) 198(30.8%) 170(26.4%) 321(49.9%) 
 
Composition of Multiple Large Shareholders 
Concerning the composition of multiple large shareholders, the study considers two major 
types of shareholders, which form about 90% of the sample firms with multiple large 
shareholders namely family companies and widely held financial institutions. Table 4 shows 
that, only 5.6 % of all companies having multiple large shareholders have both the largest 
shareholder and the second largest, financial institutions while 39.1% of all companies with 
multiple large shareholders have both the largest and second largest, family companies. On 
the other hand, while 19.1 % of companies with multiple large shareholders have the largest 
shareholder a financial institution and the second largest a family company, 36.2 % of 
companies with multiple large shareholders have the largest shareholder a family company 
and the second largest a financial institution. 
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TABLE 4 
Compositions of Multiple Large Shareholders 
 
Coalition and Control Sharing 
In an attempt to measure a control dilution, the study identifies firms whose largest owners 
control less than 50% of shares, hence, their control being diluted and no single shareholder 
possesses absolute control. Table 5 shows that, among companies with multiple large 
shareholders, 24% have the largest shareholder holding less than 50% of shares of the 
company such that there is no single shareholder with full control of the company. The table 
further shows that, about 75% of the companies have shareholders with full control. While 
about 53% of the sample firms with their control shared between two larger shareholders, 
46.5% of the companies have their control shared by more than two larger shareholders. 
TABLE 5 
Coalition Formation and Control Sharing 







than 50%  
Control is shared 
by more than two 
larger 
shareholders  
Control is shared 






          48 (24%)               150 
(75%) 
                106 
(53%) 
             93 
(46.5%) 
 
Table 6 reports the number of firms in which the controlling shareholder use votes in excess 
of and equal to their cash-flow rights. In about 40% of firms the total sample the control-
rights of the  largest shareholder deviate from her cash-flow rights in which cases high voting 
shares are used to increase control. It can be observed that, there is a significantly larger 
separation of ownership and control for the largest and the second largest shareholder. When 
the mean difference of the cash flow-control rights ratio between the largest and second 
largest is tested, it was realized that the difference  are statistically significant at 1% 
significant level as depicted in table 6, panel B. 
 Companies with Multiple Large Shareholders  
 The largest is 
Financial 
institution & the 
second largest is 
also Financial 
institution 
The largest is 
Financial 
institution & the 
second largest is a 
family Company 
The largest is 
Family company  
&the  second 
largest is also 
family company  
The largest is a 
family 
company & the 
second largest 




Companies 17  58  119 110 304 
Percentage 5.6% 19.1% 39.1% 36.2% 100% 
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Table 6 also shows that, about 60% of the sample firms do not separate the ownership and 
control and therefore their cash flow-control ratio is unit. When considering the second 
largest shareholders, the table in panel A, reports that, about 25% of the companies with 
second largest owners do not separate their ownership and control while only 18.5% have 
their control-rights greater than their corresponding cash-flow rights. Table 6  reports the 
number (and percent) of firms where the 1st and the 2nd largest owner has cash-flow rights to-
control-rights (CF/CR) ratios equal to one and less than one in Panel A. Tests of mean 
difference in the use of dual-class equity to enhance control by the largest and second largest 
shareholders are reported in  Panel B.  
TABLE 6 
Separations of Ownership and Control 
Panel A: Largest shareholders’ use of dual-class equity Largest 
owner 
2nd owner 
Number (%) of CF/CR=1 firms  388(60.3%) 163(25.3%) 
Number (%) of CF/CR <1 firms  255(39.7%) 37(18.5%) 
Difference between largest owner  vs. Second largest  owner , t-value = -2.37*** 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
CONCLUSION 
In general, it can be concluded that UK equity ownership has witnessed a rapid decline by 
major domestic institutional investors and increase in foreign ownership since 2004. 
 It is also concluded that UK ownership structure is not dispersed as reported in previously 
literature .The fact that about 47% of sampled firms are controlled by ultimately held 
companies at 10% threshold while 53% are firms owned by widely-held companies 
preliminarily support that corporate ownership is concentrated among UK Companies . 
It is further reported that only 25% of ultimately owned companies are controlled by 
widely-held financial institutions, while 65% of the control of ultimately owned companies 
rests in the hands of families. This provides direct preliminary evidence that the agency 
problem between majority and minority shareholders in UK listed companies is becoming 
severe, when compared to in the 1980’s where most companies were widely held and the core 
agency problem was between managers and shareholders.  
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